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Abstract
The interruption of gas supply to the EU through Ukraine in January 2009 has been
the largest gas crises in the EU ever. This was the triggering event to develop and
finally enact Regulation 994/2010 on security of gas supply, nowadays of mandatory
implementation by EU Member States (MS). According to this Regulation, MS have to
develop a Risk Assessment (RA), a Preventive Action Plan (PAP) and an Emergency
Plan (EP), among other obligations. The development of a RA needs the identification
of a number of scenarios, and the estimation of their probabilities and consequences.
In this paper, we focus our effort on the correct estimation of consequences of po-
tential scenarios. Given the complex and dynamic behavior of national or regional
gas transport systems (GTS), this estimation can only be done with an adequate gas
transport network simulation model. In previous work, a mathematical engine (SAInt)
was developed for simulating hydraulic transients in GTS under isothermal conditions.
Nevertheless, the actual resolution of transport equations is not sufficient to simulate
the degrees of freedom of a network to react to a transient or, more severe, to a gas
supply disruption. In this paper, we identify the different actions that the operator,
market actors and authorities may adopt in the different steps of a gas crisis and
the infrastructure elements used to implement those actions (production sites - PRO,
underground gas storage facilities - UGS, liquefied natural gas regasification terminals
- LNG, compressor stations – CS, cross border entry points - CBE, etc.). Furthermore,
we identify the different possible control modes of each facility in the gas infrastructure
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and implement them in SAInt to further develop its capabilities as an integrated sim-
ulation tool to analyze gas supply disruptions. Finally, we apply SAInt on a real world
instance.
Keywords: natural gas crises, security of gas supply, gas supply disruption, transient
hydraulic simulation
1 Introduction
The interruption of the gas flows to the EU through Ukraine in January 2009 has been
the largest gas crises in the EU ever. Russian gas exports through Ukraine were dras-
tically reduced on January 6th, 2009, and completely interrupted the day after. Gas
flows started again on January 20th and were completely restored only on January
22nd. This event triggered a deep analysis of EU vulnerability to gas disruptions led by
the European Commission. The final result of this effort ended up with the enactment
of Regulation 994/2010 [1] on security of gas supply. According to this Regulation,
MS have to develop a Risk Assessment (RA), a Preventive Action Plan (PAP) and an
Emergency Plan (EP), among other obligations. The target of the RA is to identify the
scenarios that introduce most risk into the system (more likely to happen and more se-
vere in consequences). Results of the RA are input to the PAP and the EP. The target
of the PAP is to deploy measures to prevent the occurrence of scenarios that contribute
most to the risk, or at least to make them less likely to happen. The target of the EP
is to design strategies to mitigate the consequences of severe scenarios, should they
happen.
The development of a RA needs the identification of a number of scenarios, and the
estimation of their probabilities and consequences. Normally, consequences are given
in terms of non-supplied gas per off-take point of the gas transport network, and even-
tually integrated for the entire network. In this paper, we focus our effort on the correct
estimation of consequences of potential scenarios. Given the complex and dynamic
behaviour of a national or regional gas transport system, this estimation can only be
done with the adequate gas transport network simulation models. In previous work [2],
a mathematical engine (SAInt - Scenario Analysis Interface for Energy Systems) has
been developed for simulating hydraulic transients in gas transport networks under
isothermal conditions. The use of a transient hydraulic model is inevitable, due to the
dynamic nature of the prevailing processes in gas systems.
Nevertheless, the actual resolution of transport equations is not enough to simulate
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the degrees of freedom of a network to react to a transient or, more severe, to a gas
disruption. In normal operation Transmission System Operators (TSOs), following mar-
ket decisions, network codes and network good practice management, have the ca-
pability to make decisions concerning the use of the different facilities of the network
(production sites - PS, underground gas storage facilities - UGS, liquefied natural gas
regasification terminals - LNG, compressor stations – CS, cross border import stations
- CBI, cross border export points – CBE, etc.) in order to optimize its use. When a gas
disruption takes place, according to the EP other actors may intervene, as for example
the Competent Authority (CA), obliging the TSO to adopt specific actions to mitigate
the impact of the crises on gas customers.
In this paper, we identify the different actions that the operator, market actors and au-
thorities may adopt in the different steps of a gas crisis and the infrastructure elements
used to implement them. Next, we identify the different possible control modes and
constraints of each infrastructure element and implement them in SAInt to further de-
velop its capabilities as an integrated simulation tool to analyze gas supply disruptions.
Finally, we apply SAInt on a real world instance.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 a formal definition of risk is provided,
where we focus on the ’consequence’ element of the term ’Risk’. In section 3 we ad-
dress the identification of the different measures that TSOs, authorities and market
actors may adopt in the different steps of a gas crisis, and the types of facilities that
may be affected by such decisions. Section 4 is dedicated to describing the different
ways of controlling each type of facility and the manner to program such ways of con-
trol. Finally, in section 5 we show the actual implementation of the models developed
in the previous sections by means of a real world instance.
2 Definition of Risk
The word ’risk’ is frequently used in a very informal manner. Quite often, risk is defined
as probability times consequences (or impact, or damage). Essentially, this means that
a measure of risk has to account for potential consequences and weigh them with their
corresponding probabilities (likelihoods). A more operational definition of risk follows in
the next paragraphs. Standard ISO 31010 indicates that Risk Assessments attempt to
answer the following fundamental questions:
• What can happen and why?
• What are the consequences?
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• What is the probability of its future occurrence?
Kaplan and Garrick [3] showed that a formal answer to these three questions requires
describing risk through the use of a set of triplets
R = {< si, φi, yi >} i = 1, 2, . . . , N (1)
where
1. si represents scenario i in the set of N scenarios considered.
2. φi is the probability of scenario i.
3. yi is the potential consequence under the conditions of scenario i.
This constitutes a formal mathematical definition of risk, although it does not account
for all sources of uncertainty. Under this definition each scenario is characterized by
its probability and its consequence(s) (one or several consequence variables may be
considered, but only one possible value of each consequence variable is considered).
Adopting this definition of Risk means that all possible scenarios must be identified
and the probability of each must be estimated. Moreover, for each scenario, the con-
sequence(s) for the system must be assessed.
A RA, in order to be useful, has to be as accurate as possible, and certainly free of
bias. The introduction of bias is a pervasive problem in RA. The most frequent reason
to introduce bias in a RA is a poor identification of sources of risk (typically classified as
hazards, equivalent to non-intentional events, and threats or intentional actions leading
to undesired events). This problem produces in most occasions a severe underestima-
tion of risk. This is the reason why many techniques have been developed in order to
avoid this problem, from the simple brainstorming to the much more elaborate Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) or the Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP).
Nevertheless, the incorrect assessment of consequences of different scenarios - gas
crises -, leads certainly to biases in the estimation of risk, probably not as severe as the
ones derived from a poor identification of sources of risk, but certainly undesired. This
is a problem that has been systematically ignored in the literature. Typically, problems
of gas disruptions have been addressed at a very coarse level of granularity, as much
in space as in time [4–9].
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3 Measures to Mitigate the Impact of Gas Disruptions
Regulation 994/2010 [1] on security of gas supply has as one of its key elements the EP.
According to the Regulation, the EP has to be designed taking into account the results
of the RA. The target of the EP is to mitigate as much as possible the effects of risky
scenarios, in order to contribute to decreasing the risk level associated to the studied
gas system. This means it has to be designed to react to the scenarios that introduce
more risk into the system, decreasing their consequences as much as possible.
Regulation 994/2010 [1] builds the EP upon three crisis levels:
1. ’Early warning’: when there is concrete, serious and reliable information that an
event may occur which is likely to result insignificant deterioration of the supply
situation.
2. ’Alert’: when a supply disruption or exceptionally high gas demand occurs which
results in significant deterioration of the supply situation, but the market is still
able to manage the situation.
3. ’Emergency’: in the event of exceptionally high gas demand, significant supply
disruption or other significant deterioration of the supply situation and in the event
that all relevant market measures have been implemented but the supply of gas
is insufficient to meet the remaining gas demand so that non-market measures
have to be additionally introduced.
As it can be seen in the definition of the three crisis levels, security of gas supply mar-
ket measures and non-market measures are listed. The Regulation [1] considers in its
annexes II and III the main market and non-market measures that may be adopted,
and these are further classified as either supply side or demand side measures. This
classification is provided in Tab. 1. Some of these measures have more to do with the
PAP than with the EP, as for example diversification of gas supply routes, the deploy-
ment of new LNG regasification facilities or of new gas storage facilities, investments in
infrastructure, including bi-directional capacity, among others. These are options that,
if adopted, lead to decreased probabilities of some potential events / crises, but cannot
be adopted when the crisis has already started. Measures that have to do with the EP
are, for example, increased production flexibility, increased import flexibility, and reverse
flows, among others. The security of supply measures considered in the Regulation [1]
related to the EP, when implemented in case of crisis, involve necessarily the use of
some network facilities. Normally, the operator will have to react to the event triggering
the crisis by changing the operational mode of some of the facilities. For example, to
5
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Tab. 1: Security of gas supply measures. Adapted from Regulation 994/2010 [1] on
security of gas supply.











s • increased production flexibility,
• increased import flexibility,
• facilitating the integration of gas from
renewable energy sources into the
gas network infrastructure (power to
gas),
• commercial gas storage-withdrawal
capacity and volume of gas in storage,
• LNG terminal capacity and maximal
send-out capacity,
• diversification of gas supplies and gas
routes,
• reverse flows,
• coordinated dispatching by
transmission system operators,
• use of long-term and short-term
contracts,
• investments in infrastructure, including
bi-directional capacity,
• contractual arrangements to ensure
security of gas supply.
• use of strategic gas storage,
• enforced use of stocks of alternative
fuels (e.g. in accordance with Council
Directive 2009/119/EC of 14
September 2009 imposing an
obligation on Member States to
maintain minimum stocks of crude oil
and/or petroleum products ( 1 )),
• enforced use of electricity generated
from sources other than gas,
• enforced increase of gas production
levels,











s • use of interruptible contracts,
• fuel switch possibilities including use
of alternative back-up fuels in
industrial and power generation
plants,
• voluntary firm load shedding,
• increased efficiency,
• increased use of renewable energy
sources.
• enforced fuel switching,
• enforced utilisation of interruptible
contracts, where not fully utilised as
part of market measures,
• enforced firm load shedding.
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react to a sudden drop in imports through an entry point, the operator could change the
control mode of some other entry points from flow control to pressure control in order to
keep the pressure at the normal operational level in the network, allowing the transport
of gas to the areas close to the entry point affected by the gas disruption. This can be
combined with a change in the control mode of other facilities to enhance the transport
of gas in the desired direction, as for example CS. Tab. 2 shows the correspondence
between the EP measures considered in the Regulation [1] and the network facilities
needed to implement them. For example, increased import flexibility means having in
place the right contracts that allow increase flows with relatively short notice to react
to problems. The way to implement this measure in the model is acting on the control
mode of the entry stations across which the shipper that provides that flexibility can
put gas into the system. The same would apply to contractual arrangements signed to
ensure security of gas supply.
The facilities modeled in SAInt to simulate the flexibility of a gas transport network un-
der normal operation and under gas crisis situations are: entry stations (CBIs, PROs),
exit stations (CGS,GPP,IND), UGS, LNG, and CS. In fact, entry and exit stations are
modeled as nodes with flow or pressure control similar to the regulator and metering
station installed in the actual station.
All measures that have to do with reduction of demand are simulated via exit stations.
At the bottom of the table we can see coordinated dispatching by TSOs. This neces-
sarily demands the use of all facilities available in the network. In the next section, we
see the way all these facilities are modeled in SAInt, most remarkably their specific
control modes and constraints.
4 Model of Gas Infrastructure
The system of equations describing the transient flow in gas systems can be expressed
by the following linearized matrix equation, derived from the one-dimensional, isother-
mal continuity and momentum equation describing the gas flow in pipelines.

Φ −AP −AN I
ADP −R 0 0
Cp 0 CN 0














where pn+1 and Ln+1 are vectors of nodal gas pressure and nodal load at a future
time point tn+1, and Qn+1P and Q
n+1
N are vectors of gas flow rates in pipe and non-
7
Pipeline Technology Conference 2016
Tab. 2: Correspondence between EP measures and network facilities needed to imple-
ment them.
Measure adopted Facility used
• increased production flexibility,
• increased import flexibility,
• use of long-term and short-term contracts, contractual
arrangements to ensure security of gas supply.
• enforced increase of gas production levels,
• use of long-term and short-term contracts, contractual
arrangements to ensure security of gas supply.
Exit Stations:




• use of interruptible contracts,
• fuel switch possibilities including use of alternative back-up fuels in
industrial and power generation plants
• voluntary firm load shedding
• enforced use of stocks of alternative fuels (e.g. in accordance with
Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an
obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude
oil and/or petroleum products ( 1 ))
• enforced use of electricity generated from sources other than gas,
• enforced fuel switching
• enforced utilisation of interruptible contracts, where not fully utilised
as part of market measures
• enforced firm load shedding
Exit Stations:
CGS - City Gate
Stations,









• commercial gas storage,
• use of strategic gas storage,




• LNG terminal capacity and maximal send-out capacity,
• increased import flexibility,
• use of long-term and short-term contracts, contractual





• coordinated dispatching by transmission system operators All
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pipe elements at a future time point tn+1, respectively. The other matrices in eq. (2)
are coefficient matrices, which depend on the state variables (p, Q, L), gas properties
(relative density, gas viscosity etc.), pipe properties (length, diameter, roughness etc.)
and properties of non-pipe facilities (adiabatic efficiency, driver efficiency, resistance
factor etc.). The detailed derivation of eq. (2) can be found in [2].
4.1 Extended Iterative Time Integration Algorithm
The system of equations expressed in eq. (2) are solved based on the iterative time
integration algorithm developed in [2], which has been extended to include a Dynamic
Control Feasibility Algorithm (DFC), a Simulation Control Evaluation Algorithm (SCE)
a Constraints and Control Handling Algorithm (CCH) for controlled non-pipe facilities
(e.g. compressor stations and regulator stations) and a Dynamic Time Step Adaptation
Method (DTA), which adapts the simulation time step ∆t in relation to the control mode
changes in order to capture these changes with a higher time resolution. Fig. 1 shows
the flow diagram of the extended algorithm which is implemented in SAInt. Each case
study in SAInt is modeled as a scenario which includes a time window, a global time
step ∆tg, an initial state for the studied network and a list of scenario definitions, defined
by the user prior to the actual solution process. As shown in Fig. 1 before the actual
time integration process the program iterates through the list of scenario definitions.
The algorithm for the remaining solution process contains three major loops, namely,
the time integration loop, marked by the solid blue flow arrows, the constraints and
control handling loop, illustrated by the dashed red flow arrows and the iterative loop,
indicated by the dashdotted green flow arrows in Fig. 1. In the following, we explain
briefly the function of these loops.
Time Integration Loop
The time integration loop is the outer loop of the transient solver. It has been extended
by a dynamic control feasibility checking algorithm (DFC), which checks if a requested
control change for a future time point tn+1 is feasible, considering the present control
of the station at time point tn. If a requested set point is not feasible, the DFC will
change the station control to the next closest feasible working point. In addition, for
some requested control changes, like for instance, turning an operating compressor
station into bypass, the DFC makes use of a simulation control object (SCO), which
enables the control of the station until a specified simulation time and/or until a specified
9
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Obtain initial network state
Generate simulation grid
using time (∆t) and
space (∆x) discretization
For each control mode in the
control list add to the control
time te an additional simula-
tion time tnr = te − ∆tr
Start time integration
for time step tn+1 = tn + ∆t
and set k = 1 & kc = 1
Make an initial approximation
for the state varialbes pn,
Qn & Ln using the solution
from the previous time step
Assemble the system matri-
ces and vectors in eq. (2)
Solve eq. (2) for iteration k
and determine residual ‖Res‖
‖Res‖ ≤ ?k ≤ kmax?
Check if the converged solu-





Invoke the Constraints and
Control Handling Algorithm
(CCH) for the affected facilities
kc = kc + 1
Inovoke the Simulation Con-
trol Evaluation Algorithm (SCE)
to evaluate each unprocessed
control in the simulation con-
trol list and to add additional
future simulation time steps
(tsmc > tn) if requested
Invoke the Dynamic Control
Feasibility Checking Algorithm
(DFC) for the active scenario
definitions for time step tn+1
defined in the scenario event list
Recompute the coefficients of the
linearized equations using the new
values for the state variables pk ,
Qk & Lk . Run a new iteration
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condition is fulfilled. The SCOs are stored in a simulation control list, which is processed
before the start of each time integration loop.
Iterative Loop
The iterative loop, in contrast, is the inner loop of the transient solver and serves the
purpose of solving the linearized system of equations (eq. (2)) iteratively. The solution
of the system of equations requires an efficient linear equation solver for each iteration
step. We have extended the linear solver used in [2] by a direct sparse solver specif-
ically designed for solving large scale structurally unsymmetric sparse linear systems
such as the system of equations expressed in eq. (2). The new solver enhances the
capability of the simulation tool for solving large scale gas systems with thousands of
elements with reasonable computation time and storage demand.
Constraints and Control Handling Loop
The constraints and control handling loop only comes into play if a station constraint
has been violated. In this case, the CCH algorithm for the specific station is invoked.
The idea behind the CCH loop is to repeat the iterative loop for the last time point tn
using new control settings for the affected station. The solver delivers to the CCH al-
gorithm a list of constraint violation objects, which contain information on the violated
parameters and their corresponding constraint levels. The constraint level is an indica-
tor of the significance of each constraint and how it should be treated by the solver. It
is subdivided into the following four levels:
1. Warning:
The solver issues a warning of a constraint violation without invoking the CCH
algorithm.
2. Soft limit:
The solver invokes the CCH algorithm, which tries to find a feasible working point
for a limited number of iterations. If no feasible working point is found the solver
ignores the violated constraint and proceeds with the next time step (tn+1).
3. Hard limit:
The solver invokes the CCH algorithm, which tries to find a feasible working point
for a limited number of iterations. If no feasible working point is found the simula-
tion is aborted.
11
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4. Stop limit:
The solver aborts the simulation without invoking the CCH algorithm.
The CCH algorithm tries to find a compromise between the violated parameter and
the existing control set point by generating a new control setting for the station. If
necessary, the CCH algorithm can issue an SCO for the affected station, which is
then added to the simulation control list and evaluated in the SCE for the specified
simulation time.
4.2 Control Modes for Non-Pipe Facilities
Non-pipe facilities, such as compressor, regulator and valve stations play a key role in
the operation and management of gas transport systems. These facilities enable the
transmission system operator (TSO) to supervise and control the gas stream, pres-
sure, temperature and the line pack in the pipeline system.
Compressor stations are usually installed every 150-300 kilometer along the gas
pipeline system. Their function is to increase the gas pressure to compensate for the
pressure losses incurred during transportation. Regulator stations, in contrast, are pri-
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marily installed in combination with metering stations at all entry and exit stations and
at the interface of two connected sub networks with different maximum operating pres-
sure levels (MOP). The purpose of a regulator station is to reduce the upstream gas
pressure to a lower downstream pressure and/or to regulate the quantity of gas flowing
through the station. Valves in turn, are installed every 10-30 km along the pipeline sys-
tem and serve the purpose of routing the gas stream and shutting down sections of the
network for maintenance or in case of a disruption. Compressor stations and regulator
Tab. 3: Overview of available control modes and constraints settings for non-pipe facil-
ities modeled as elements
















po ≥ pi & Q ≥ 0
user defined limits:
max. outlet pressure (po,max, 80 [barg])
min. inlet pressure (pi,min, 25 [barg])
max. volumetric flow (Qvol,max, 100 [m3/s])
max. flow rate (Qmax)
max. pressure Ratio (Πmax, 2 [−])












pi ≥ po & Q ≥ 0
user defined limits:
max. outlet pressure (po,max, 80 [barg])
min. inlet pressure (pi,min, 25 [barg])
max. volumetric flow (Qvol,max, 100 [m3/s])
max. flow rate (Qmax)
Valve Station closed (OFF )
opened (BP )
internal hard limit:
V ≤ 60 [m/s]
user defined limits:
max. flow velocity (Vmax, 30[m/s])
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stations are typically operated at a desired set point, which is controlled by a designated
automatic control system (ACS). The purpose of such a system is to keep the station
at the desired set point and to ensure that station constraints are not violated. Fig. 2
shows a generic functional diagram of an ACS with a feedback loop, where ~X marks
the set of state variables at the station inlet and outlet (e.g. gas pressure p, temper-
ature T and flow rate Q), G the set of (differential) equations describing the physical
processes in the station (e.g. adiabatic gas compression, isenthalpic gas expansion
etc.), ~Zext the set of external factors directly influencing the physical process (e.g. am-
bient temperature Tamb, fluctuations in demand and supply L(t), technical failures etc.),
~Xmet the set of metered state variables, ~Xset the set of operating set points available to
the dispatcher (e.g. flow rate set point Qset, inlet and outlet pressure set point pi,set and
po,set) , C the control algorithm of the controller, ~Xlim the set of station constraints (e.g.
maximum outlet pressure, maximum available compression power) and ~Yact the set of
available actuators to act on the process (percent opening of the regulator flow area,
shaft revolution etc.). The state variables ~X are continuously metered by sensors and
metering devices installed in the station ( ~Xmet). The metered data is then compared to
the desired operating set point ~Xset requested by the dispatcher. The dispatcher can
only assign one set point at a time, since the ACS typically permits the control of only
one state variable at a time. Additional set points are then treated as constraints. The
deviations between the metering data ~Xmet and the set point ~Xset are forwarded to the
controller C. The controller then checks if the deviations are within acceptable margins
and if the desired set point does not violate any station constraints ( ~Xlim). If a correction
of the state variables is necessary to maintain the set point the controller makes use
of the actuators ~Yact to act on the physical process G. In case a requested set point is
not permitted the controller will typically relax the set point to the next closest possible
operating point.
The described functions and controls of non-pipe facilities can be modeled in SAInt by
defining a scenario parameter and assigning it to the specific facility. Tab. 3 & 4 show
a list of available control modes and constraint parameters that can be assigned to the
different non-pipe facilities in the simulation model.
4.3 Modeling of Measures to Mitigate the Impact of Disruptions
The different generic control modes for non-pipe facilities presented in the last section
are similar to those available to TSOs to manage their actual systems and to react to
disruptions in the GTS. A TSO can typically change the settings of each facility dynam-
ically depending on the current state of the system and the forecasts for gas supply
14
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Tab. 4: Overview of available control modes and constraints settings for non-pipe facil-
ities modeled as nodes








min. supply flow (Qmin)
max. supply flow (Qmax)
min. supply pressure (pmin)








min. delivery flow (Qmin)
max. delivery flow (Qmax)
min. delivery pressure (pmin)
max. delivery pressure (pmax)
UGS pressure (pset)
withdrawal/injection rate (Qset)




Lwdr ≤ 0 & Linj ≥ 0
user defined hard limits:
max. working inventory (Iw,max)
max. withdrawal rate (Qwdr,max)
max. injection rate (Qinj,max)
user defined limits:
max. supply pressure (pwdr,max)
min. offtake pressure (pinj,min)
LNG Terminal pressure (pset)
regasification rate (Qset)
initial working inventory (INV )
arriving vessel size (V ESSEL)
internal hard limits:
L ≤ 0
user defined hard limits:
max. working inventory (Iw,max)
max. regasification rate (Qreg,max)
user defined limits:
max. supply pressure (preg,max)
15
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and demand. In case of a disruption, the TSO will typically follow a strict sequence of
actions and measures (protocol) to mitigate the impact of the disruption. The degrees
of freedom available to the TSO to apply these measures, which are included in the
Emergency Plan and are based on the events identified in the Risk Assessmentent,
will depend on the legal commitments with other stakeholders (gas customers, ship-
pers, producers, competent authorities etc.) and the technical restrictions imposed by
the gas infrastructure (pressure, flow and power limits etc.). To model these actions to-
gether with the available control modes listed in Tab. 3 & 4, we introduce a conditional
expression for the execution of a requested control change of non-pipe facilities. The
conditional expression may depend on a number of different network parameters, such
as the line pack level, available supply and facilities, current gas demand. By doing this,
we enable the simulation model to react dynamically to a disruption, similar to how a
TSO would react in reality, allowing by these means a more realistic simulation of the
gas network behavior and a better quality estimation of gas crises consequences.
Furthermore, to model the different entities and their responsibilities in the combined
simulation model of interconnected multinational gas transport systems, we introduce
the possibility of dividing the simulation model into different subsystems, which we then
assign to the different entities responsible for their operation. Each subsystem has the
same properties as the total network model. This way, we can use the parameters of
the subsystems in the conditional expressions to request a change in control mode. For
instance, we could impose an increase in gas supply to a subsystem in case of a drop
in line pack below a certain threshold. In the next section, we give a brief description
of the developed simulation software. Finally, we demonstrate the capabilities of the
software by applying it to a real world instance.
5 Model Application
The models presented in this paper have been implemented in a simulation software
- SAInt (Scenario Analysis Interface for Energy Systems), which has been developed
in MS Visual Studio .NET with the object oriented programming languages VB.NET,
C# and C++. SAInt is divided into two separate modules, namely, SAInt-API (Appli-
cation Programming Interface) and SAInt-GUI (Graphical User Interface). The API, is
the main library of the software and contains all solvers and classes for instantiating
the different objects comprising the gas system model (nodes, pipes, compressors
etc.). The API is independent of the GUI and can be used separately in any other en-
vironment supporting .NET libraries (e.g. MS Excel, Visual Studio etc., Iron Python).
16
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SAInt-GUI is the graphical interface, which enables a visual communication between
the API and the user. The GUI uses the classes and solvers provided by the API to
perform the simulation tasks requested by the user.
In this section, we apply the models implemented in SAInt to perform a case study on
one of the regions affected by the gas crisis in January 2009, namely, the Bulgarian
and Greek National Gas Transport Systems (NGTS). In the case study, we assess the
Fig. 4: Assigned subsystems in the Bulgarian-Greek simulation model
a) Subsystem 1: Bulgaria - Transmission b) Subsystem 2: Bulgarian - Transit
c) Subsystem 3: Greece - North Region d) Subsystem 4: Greece - South Region
resilience of the network in case of a disruption in a compressor station. We apply
mitigation measures to reduce the impact of the disruption by changing the settings
of specific facilities using conditional control settings. Fig. 3 shows a snapshot of the
18
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network model in the graphical user interface of SAInt. As illustrated in Fig. 3 and
Tab. 5: Properties of the Bulgarian-Greek NGTS
Property Value Unit
Number Of Nodes 217
Number Of Elements 221
Number Of Grid Segments 345
Number Of Grid Points 352
Number Of Loops 5
Total Pipe Length 3610.697 [km]
Total Geometric Pipe Volume 1574337.774 [m3]
Max Pipe Diameter 1174.2 [mm]
Min Pipe Diameter 140.8 [mm]
Tab. 6: Properties of the assigned subsystems
Subsystem Nodes Elements Supply Demand Compressor
BG_RING 92 95 0 32 4
BG_TRANSIT 25 27 1 2 6
EL_NORTH 35 34 1 11 0
EL_SOUTH 65 65 1 26 1
Tab. 7: Input parameter for transient simulation of the Bulgarian-Greek network model
Parameter Symbol Value Unit
time step ∆t 900 [s]
total simulation time tmax 48 [h]
gas temperature T 288.15 [K]
dynamic viscosity η 10−5 [kg/m · s]
standard pressure pn 1.01325 [bar]
standard temperature Tn 273.15 [K]
relative density d 0.6 [-]
Tab. 5, the Bulgarian-Greek simulation model comprises of 210 pipe elements (total
pipe length of approx. 3600 [km] and total geometric pipe volume of approx. 1.6 Mil-
lion m3), 11 compressor stations (10 located in Bulgaria and 1 in Greece) and 217
nodes (67 exit stations to the local distribution system (CGS) and to direct served cus-
tomers (GPP, IND), two Cross Border Export Stations (CBE), 2 Cross Border Import
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Fig. 5: Snapshot of the SAInt-Node-Editor showing the assigned constraints to CBI-
Negru Voda
Fig. 6: Snapshot of the SAInt-Node-Editor showing the assigned constraints to CBI-
Kipi
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Stations (CBI), one LNG Terminal and one Underground Gas Storage Facility (UGS)).
The Bulgarian-Greek NGTS is basically structured into two national transmission sys-
Fig. 7: Snapshot of SAInt-Storage Editor (left) and LNG-Terminal-Editor (right) showing
the assigned properties for UGS-Chiren (left) and LNG-Terminal-Revythoussa
(right)
tems and a transit pipeline transporting a large quantity of gas from CBI Negru Voda to
the CBEs at the border to Turkey (Malcoclar), FYRO Macedonia (Zidilova) and Greece
(Sidirokastron). Apart from CBI-Negru Voda, there are three additional entry points to
the NGTS, namely, UGS-Chiren in Bulgaria (depleted gas field storage with supply
from storage during winter and injection during summer), LNG Terminal -Revythoussa,
Greece, and CBI-Kipi at the Greek-Turkish border. For the case study, we divide the
network model into four subsystems, as shown in Fig. 4 and Tab. 6. We will use the
parameters of the subsystems to define conditional expressions for the control of sur-
rounding non-pipe facilities.
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In order to start the dynamic simulation, we need an initial state of the network model,
Fig. 8: SAInt-Profile-Editor showing the relative 24h load profile assigned to demand
nodes representing city gate stations
which we obtain from a steady state computation. The results of the steady state com-
putation is shown in the map in Fig. 3, where the pressure and load distribution and
the gas flow direction in the pipelines are depicted. The input data for the loads are
based on peak winter consumption in 2011. Moreover, each supply node in the model
is pressure controlled, while each compressor station (except the compressor station
at UGS-Chiren, which is typically used for storage injection) is outlet pressure con-
trolled with pressure set points ranging between 40-54 [barg]. For the cross border
import stations Negru Voda and Kipi, we define constraints for the maximum pressure
and maximum supply quantity, as shown in the snapshot of the node dialogs in Fig.
5 & 6. For the dynamic simulation, we assign to the demand nodes representing city
gate stations the characteristic relative load profile depicted in Fig. 8, which we multiply
with the corresponding steady state loads. For the other demand nodes, we assume a
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Fig. 9: Snapshot of the SAInt scenario definition table showing the defined boundary
conditions disruption events and mitigation strategy for the case study
constant profile equal to the steady state load. Moreover, for each city gate station, we
define a minimum delivery pressure limit of 20 [barg] and for the two cross border ex-
port stations a minimum delivery pressure of 30 [barg]. Furthermore, for UGS-Chiren
and LNG-Revythoussa, we use the storage envelope and facility limits shown in the
snapshot of the storage and LNG-Terminal dialog in Fig. 7. Additional simulation set-
tings and gas properties are listed in Tab. 7.
23
Pipeline Technology Conference 2016
To assess the resilience of the network and to show the capability of the simulation tool
to model the reaction of the gas system to supply disruptions, we introduce a disrup-
tion in the compressor station CS-Petrich located at the Bulgarian-Greek border. Fig. 9
shows a snapshot of the SAInt- Scenario Definition Table, where the different control
parameter definitions are listed. After the start of the simulation (6:00), we interrupt the
gas flow from the Bulgarian transit pipeline to Greece by shutting down the compressor
station CS-Petrich at 12:00. The flow interruption is relaxed 12 hours later at midnight
00:00 by changing the control mode of the station to bypass. To mitigate the supply dis-
Fig. 10: Time series of Line Pack (LP) and Minimum Pressure (PMIN) in the subsys-
tems EL_NORTH (GSUB.0) and EL_SOUTH (GSUB.3)
ruption, we define conditional control settings to the surrounding compressor stations,
namely, CS-Ihtiman and CS-Nea Messimvria. We request a change in control mode
for CS-Nea Messimvria from outlet pressure to inlet pressure control with a control set
point of 35 [barg], if the minimum pressure in the subsystem EL_North is below 30
[barg], in order to stabilize the pressure in EL_North.
In addition, we request a change in control mode for CS-Ihtiman from outlet pressure
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control to maximum driver power control, whenever the line pack in the subsystem
EL_South goes below 12.5 [Msm3]. If the line pack is above this threshold, we re-
quest the station to return to its original outlet pressure control. In reality such a control
change, would require the coordination of the two TSOs as indicated in the list of mit-
igation measures in Tab. 2. The results of the computation are shown in Fig. 11 - 17
and are discussed in the following.
Fig. 11 - 13 show the time series of the station control, inlet and outlet pressure and
flow rate for the compressor stations CS-Ihtiman (top plot, CS.8), CS-Petrich (middle
plot, CS.9) and CS-Nea Messimvria (bottom plot, CS.10). As can be seen in the middle
time plots, the flow through CS-Petrich is interrupted at 12:00, causing the inlet pres-
sure to increase and the outlet pressure of the station to decrease. The disruption also
affects the pressure level and total line pack in the subsystem EL_North as depicted
in figure 10, where the total line pack and the minimum pressure in the subsystems
EL_North (GSUB.0) and EL_South (GSUB.3) are depicted. At approximately 15:00 the
minimum pressure in subsystem EL_North drops below 30 [barg], which is the thresh-
old for changing the control of CS-Nea Messimvria to inlet pressure control. At the time
where this condition is fulfilled, the inlet pressure of CS-Nea Messimvria is above the
requested set point of 35 [barg], thus, to achieve the requested set point the station
compresses more gas from the suction to the discharge side, causing the flow rate to
increase (s. bottom plot of Fig. 13) and the driver power to reach its maximum value
(s. bottom plot of Fig. 11). The requested inlet pressure set point is finally reached at
approx 18:00 (s. bottom plot of Fig. 12).
The effect of the second mitigation measure can be seen if we compare the time series
of the line pack in subsystem EL_South ( Fig. 10) and the time series for the compres-
sor station CS-Ihtiman. At approx. 21:00 the line pack in subsystem EL_South drops
below 12.5 [Msm3], causing the compressor station to change its original pressure out-
let set point from 50 [barg] to the maximum outlet pressure [54 barg]. This set point
differs from the requested maximum driver power control (s. Fig. 9). The reason for this
is, that operating the compressor station at maximum driver power would violate the
maximum outlet pressure constraint, thus the constraint and control handling algorithm
considers the next feasible working point, which in this case is the maximum outlet
pressure.
The maximum outlet pressure control is relaxed at approx. 4:00, when the line pack
in subsystem EL_South rises above 12.5 [Msm3]. In this case the station is set back
to its original outlet pressure control of 50 [barg]. Since the original pressure set point
is below the outlet pressure at 4:00 (54 [barg]), the flow through the station is firstly
interrupted until the outlet pressure drops back to 50 [barg].
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Fig. 11: Time series of station controls for compressor stations CS-Ihtiman (CS.8), CS-
Petrich (CS.9) & CS-Nea Messimvria (CS.10)
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Fig. 14-17 show the time series of the station control, pressure and load for the four
entry points CBI-Negru Voda, CBI-Kipi, UGS-Chiren and LNG-Revythoussa. In these
plots, we see the effect of the station constraints on the control set point of the station
and also how the disruption in CS-Petrich affected the entry points. The most affected
facilities are CBI-Kippi and LNG-Revythoussa, where the gas supply rises to its maxi-
mum, in order to balance the demand in the northern and southern Greek region.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a transient hydraulic simulation tool for analyzing the conse-
quences of natural gas supply disruptions. In the first part, we gave a formal definition
of the term Risk and discussed the different elements comprising a Risk Assessment,
namely, the identification of potential scenarios and the estimation of their probability
and consequences. We pointed out the importance of estimating the consequences
of potential scenarios in an adequate manner, using hydraulic models that reflect the
dynamic behavior of the gas transport systems appropriately. Furthermore, we gave
an overview of the different mitigation measures that can be adopted to reduce the
impact of gas supply disruptions and the facilities in the gas infrastructure to apply
these measures. Next, we presented an algorithm for solving the physical equations
describing the dynamic behavior of gas transport systems. In addition, we elaborated
how to model the control settings of non-pipe facilities such as compressor stations
and regulator stations and how these control modes are implemented in the simulation
tool SAInt. Finally, we apply the methods developed in this paper to a real world in-
stance, where we demonstrated capability of the developed tool to simulate gas supply
disruptions and to model and asses demand and supply side measures to mitigate the
impact of gas supply disruptions.
In the near future, we intend to extend the simulation tool to include a model of the
electric power system, in order to analyze the interdependency of gas a electric power
systems in an integrated manner.
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Fig. 12: Time series of inlet pressure (PI) and outlet pressure (PO) for compressor
stations CS-Ihtiman (CS.8), CS-Petrich (CS.9) & CS-Nea Messimvria (CS.10)
29
Pipeline Technology Conference 2016
Fig. 13: Time series of flow rate (Q) for compressor stations CS-Ihtiman (CS.8), CS-
Petrich (CS.9) & CS-Nea Messimvria (CS.10)
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Fig. 14: Time series of of delivered gas quantity, station control, load and pressure for
the Cross Border Import Negru Voda
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Fig. 15: Time series of of delivered gas quantity, station control, load and pressure for
the Cross Border Import Kipi
32
Pipeline Technology Conference 2016
Fig. 16: Time series of of the supply, storage inventory, delivered gas quantity, station
control, pressure and storage envelope for the Underground Gas Storage Fa-
cility Chiren
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Fig. 17: Time series of the supply, storage inventory, delivered gas quantity, station
control, pressure and storage envelope for the LNG-Terminal Revythoussa
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